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Abstract. Efficiency is the bottleneck of many cryptographic protocols
towards their practical application in different contexts. This holds true
also in the context of electronic voting, where cryptographic protocols
are used to ensure a diversity of security requirements, e.g. secrecy and
integrity of cast votes. A new and promising application area of electronic
voting is boardroom voting, which in practice takes place very frequently
and often on simple issues such as approving or refusing a budget. Hence,
it is not a surprise that a number of cryptographic protocols for boardroom
voting have been already proposed. In this work, we introduce a security
model adequate for the boardroom voting context. Further, we evaluate
the efficiency of four boardroom voting protocols, which to best of our
knowledge are the only boardroom voting protocols that satisfy our
security model. Finally, we compare the performance of these protocols
in different election settings.
1 Introduction
In many practical applications of cryptographic protocols, efficiency is one of
the most crucial aspects to consider. Electronic voting, where cryptographic
protocols are deployed to fulfill multiple security requirements such as vote
secrecy or integrity, is not an exception. Currently, electronic voting has become of
paramount interest for various contexts reaching from political elections at polling
stations [1] or over the Internet [2, 3] to board elections in organisations such
as universities, companies, or associations [4]. A new and promising application
area of electronic voting is boardroom voting, which in practice takes place
very frequently and often on simple issues such as approving or refusing a
budget. Hence, it is not a surprise that a number of cryptographic protocols for
boardroom voting have been already proposed [5–12]. Generally, such elections
are spontaneously initiated and conducted quickly. Therefore, voters use small
mobile devices such as their smartphones or tablet computers. Under these
circumstances, the efficiency of cryptographic protocols for boardroom voting
becomes even more important. The research goal of this work is to evaluate
cryptographic protocols for boardroom voting regarding their efficiency within
different election settings.
In order to achieve our goal, we proceed as follows. First, we study the
boardroom voting context and propose a security model tailored to that context.
We review the literature and identify boardroom voting protocols that satisfy
the proposed security model. We evaluate the identified protocols with regard to
their efficiency. This evaluation is divided into two steps: First, we decompose
boardroom voting protocols in their cryptographic building blocks and determine
the required number of modular exponentiations. Second, we provide parametrized
efficiency functions for the boardroom voting protocols. Finally, we compare the
performance of boardroom voting protocols within different election settings, i.e.,
by looking at different electorate sizes and ballot types.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of
boardroom elections. The research method of this work is presented in Section 3.
Thereafter, we introduce an adequate security model in Section 4. We identify
boardroom voting protocols that satisfy the security model in Section 5. Section 6
outlines the cryptographic building blocks of the considered protocols. In Section 7
we evaluate the efficiency of the protocols. Section 8 provides a performance
comparison within different election settings. The work is concluded and directions
for future research are indicated in Section 9.
2 Boardroom Elections
In this section we provide a general overview of elections in the context of
boardroom voting. We mainly focus on the setting and procedure of boardroom
elections. Further, we consider boardroom voting elections in the context of
companies, where current security mechanisms and policies are deployed.
2.1 Election Setting
Electorate: Boardroom elections, which usually take place during boardroom
meetings, are small-scale elections and therefore have a limited electorate. We
denote the number of voters in the electorate as N . Some of them may follow the
boardroom meeting and participate in the voting process from a remote place,
for instance via phone or video conference.
Type of Election: Boardroom voting is mostly used for simple issues such as
yes/no decisions, i.e., the voting rules are relatively simple and the number of
voting options is limited. A common voting rule is approval voting, where voters
can select one or none out of L options.
Equipment and Communication Infrastructure: Boardroom elections are often
spontaneously initiated and conducted, and voters usually bring their commonly
used device, for example a notebook, smartphone or tablet computer, on which
the voting application has already been installed. Additionally, the voters’ devices
are usually connected to a common network, which allows exchanging messages
(encrypted and signed votes) via a reliable broadcast channel.
Public-Key Infrastructure: In order to ensure the authenticity and integrity of
the exchanged messages, boardroom elections imply the existence and deployment
of a public-key infrastructure (PKI).4
2.2 Election Procedure
The first phase in a boardroom election procedure is to agree on the voting
options. Usually, these options are identified and agreed during a discussion
round on the corresponding topic. We assume the following election setting: 1)
V = {V1, . . . , VN} represents the set of voters; 2) L represents the number of voting
options, of which each voter can choose one or none; and 3) C = (C1, . . . , CL)
represents the voting options. Furthermore, for sake of simplicity, we assume
that all voters hold their own devices, which contain the voting application and
are interconnected over a reliable broadcasting channel. The next phases can be
defined as follows:
Initialization In order to initialize the voting application one of the voters, for
instance the head of the board, enters the voting options C and the set of voters
V5. Note that this task can be performed by any member of the electorate.
Afterwards, C and V are forwarded to all other voters.
Setup Even though the steps of this phase are slightly different in each of the
protocols considered in Section 7, they all share the following steps: 1) Selection
of a private value; 2) Computation of the public part of the selected private value;
and 3) Creation of a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge regarding the selected
private value. At the end of this phase all voters are in possession of the necessary
key material to cast a vote.
Vote Casting In the vote casting phase each voter selects one of the available
voting options. Let Ci ∈ C denote the option (vote) selected by voter Vi ∈ V.
Afterwards, the voting application cryptographically scrambles and signs Ci, in
order to protect its authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality (secrecy). We denote
ei as the output of cryptographically scrambling and signing Ci. In addition, a
zero-knowledge proof pii regarding the well-formedness of ei is computed. Voter Vi
casts her vote by forwarding the tuple Ei = (ei, pii) to all other voters. The voting
phase ends when all voters hold and have verified the set E = {E1, . . . , EN}.
Tallying In the tallying phase voters cooperate to compute the final election
result R from the set E . In general, the final election result, which is known to
all cooperating voters, is defined as R = (r1, . . . , rL), where rj ∈ {0, . . . , N} is
the number of votes for option Cj and
∑
j rj ≤ N .
4 Note that if the PKI does not exist in beforehand, it can be setup using a protocol
such as SafeSlinger [13].
5 To simplify the process of entering voters the voting application could have access to
the voter’s address book.
3 Research Method
The efficiency of boardroom voting protocols is essentially determined by the
computational complexity of the used cryptographic primitives/protocols. In order
to avoid that security is sacrificed for the sake of efficiency, the considered protocols
should fulfill a security model adequate to the boardroom context. We therefore
propose an adequate security model, which consists of security requirements
and adversarial capabilities. We identify boardroom voting protocols from the
scientific literature and consider only those that satisfy the proposed security
model. Further, we determine the efficiency of each protocol by calculating the
number of exponentiations of all cryptographic building blocks in use. For the
sake of comparison, in our analysis we omit exponentiations with small exponents:
If calculations occur in a multiplicative group of order q, and lq denotes the bit
length of q, we consider only exponentiations for exponents with the potential
of having the bit length of lq. Similarly, we only consider the computations
relevant for a specific election. We do not take into account the computational
complexity of the generation of general public parameters, such as the group
used in the calculations or the independent generators of that group. We decided
to limit our analysis to the theoretical performance only: while there have been
practical implementations of the considered protocols [10,11,14,15], a performance
comparison between them is infeasible due to difference in the implementations,
such as software architecture, ways of network communication etc. Finally, we
provide a performance comparison of all considered protocols within different
election settings.
4 Adequate Security Model
In this section we propose an adequate security model for context of boardroom
voting. The security model consists of two parts, namely the security requirements
and the adversarial capabilities. Further, we advocate the adequacy of the security
model by justifying the adversarial capabilities.
4.1 Security Requirements
Many scientific works, e.g. [16–19], are dedicated to the definition of security
requirements in the context of Internet voting protocols. As the requirements
eligibility and anonymity depend on the specific implementation in terms of
authentication, within this work we restrict our attention to secrecy, integrity,
robustness. We build our work upon the following definitions:
Secrecy : The protocol does not provide more evidence about an eligible voter’s
intention than the election result does [16].
Integrity : The protocol ensures that each vote is correctly included in the
election result [16].
Robustness: The protocol returns the election result [20].
4.2 Adversarial Capabilities
We assume that the adversarial capabilities are restricted as follows6:
The adversary is computationally restricted and therefore cannot break the un-
derlying cryptographic primitives/protocols, namely the decisional Diffie-Hellman
assumption holds. We justify this restriction by the fact that boardroom elections
are spontaneously initiated and conducted, i.e. the time frame to manipulate
votes is relatively limited. Furthermore, the impact of the election result is timely
limited, i.e. the violation of vote secrecy in the long-term is not a significant
concern.
The adversary is not able to corrupt more than half of the voters with regard
to secrecy violations. We justify this assumption by the fact that if more than half
of the voters are corrupt, they can dictate their intention regarding the election
outcome. In this case vote secrecy becomes subordinated (relatively irrelevant).
The adversary cannot compromise or coerce voters to violate their vote
secrecy7. Hence, we assume that voters are honest and do not provide the
adversary with any proof of how they voted. Further, voters are free to ignore
adversarial instructions, which aim to violate their vote secrecy. Similarly to
Benaloh [21] and Loeber [22], we justify this restriction by the fact that modern-
technology, for instance wearable cameras such as Google glasses, render even
protections used in the paper-based polling station elections mostly inefficacious.
The adversary is not able to disrupt messages sent over the communication
channel. This restriction is justified by the fact that mechanisms that ensure a
reliable communication channel, for instance Byzantine agreement [23], are in
place.
The adversary is not able to block at least half of the voters from the
communication channel. This restriction is justified by the fact that even if the
adversary can block one communication channel, e.g. WLAN, voters can use a
different channel, e.g. mobile network.
The adversary is not able to compromise voters’ devices in order to violate
vote secrecy. We justify this restriction by the fact that in the business context,
there are often policies in place, which mitigate the risk of malware infection.
5 Literature Review
A number of boardroom voting protocols have been proposed in the literature.
A seminal work to boardroom voting protocols has been presented by DeMillo
et al. [5] and extended in [6]. The protocol uses a decryption mix net approach
for anonymizing votes. A second branch of works has been initiated by Kiayias
6 In the remainder of this work, we do not distinguish between adversarial actions and
benign failures.
7 We recognize that there might be scenarios where this assumption cannot be made,
and consider the forms of coercion that are possible in boardroom voting setting and
the extent to which the existing solutions can ensure coercion resistance a direction
in future work
et al [7] and improved in [8,9]. All of these protocols rely on the availability of
all voters to compute the election result. Consequently, these protocols fail to
fulfill robustness according to our proposed security model. Ritter [10] adapted
the technique of homomorphic tallying to the boardroom voting context and
proposed two derivations of his protocol tailored towards simple and complex
ballots. In similar vein, Kulyk et al. [11] adapted the technique of reencryption
mix net-based election to the boardroom voting context. Further, Khader et
al. [12] suggested a boardroom voting protocol building upon self-dissolving
commitments. These protocols, namely [10, 11] and [12] satisfy the proposed
security model and are therefore considered in the remainder of this work.
6 Cryptographic Building Blocks of Boardroom Voting
Protocols
After the protocols that satisfy our security model have been identified, we
decompose the protocols into their cryptographic building blocks. Further, we
describe the building blocks and determine the number of exponentiations of each
building block. As mentioned above, some of the exponentiations are not counted
due to the fact, that the exponents are short given the considered election setting.
The results are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: A summary of the computational costs of the cryptographic primitives used in this paper
in terms of number of exponentiations.
Cryptographic Primitive Task Exponentiations
ElGamal cryptosystem
Encryption 2
Decryption 1
Digital signature algorithm (DSA)
Generate signature 1
Verification 2
Advanced encryption standard
Encryption 0
Decryption 0
Diffie-Hellman key exchange
Calculating own part of key 1
Combining with the part from communication partner 1
Commitment
Commitment 1
Check opening 1
Knowledge of discrete logarithm
Proof generation 1
Verification 2
Equality of discrete logarithms
Proof generation 2
Verification 4
Well-formedness proof for 2 options [24]
Proof generation 6
Verification 8
Well-formedness proof for L > 2 options [25]
Proof generation 11
Verification 11
Threshold ElGamal key generation for t ≤ N Generate public key 2N
Generate private key shares N + t− 2
Threshold ElGamal decryption for t ≤ N
Partial decryption 1
Proof generation 2
Verification 4 t
Plaintext reconstruction t
Re-encryption mix net (N encryptions)
Mixing 2N
Proof generation 8N + 5
Verification 9N + 11
ElGamal cryptosystem The main goal of cryptosystems is to ensure the
confidentiality of messages. Generally, boardroom voting protocols build upon
the ElGamal cryptosystem [26], which is probabilistic and asymmetric. This
cryptosystem is of particular interest for boardroom voting protocols due to its
homomorphic properties.
Digital signatures Digital signatures serve the purpose of ensuring the in-
tegrity of messages and sender authenticity. While the security model underlying
the boardroom voting protocols implies a reliable broadcast channel to ensure
the integrity of messages, sender authenticity is ensured by the use of digital
signatures.
Note that none of the considered protocols requires the use of a specific digital
signature algorithm. Thus for the sake of consistency in our efficiency evaluation,
we assume the use of DSA signatures [27] as these signatures build upon the
DDH assumption.
Advanced encryption standard The advanced encryption standard (AES)
[28] has been established as the standard symmetric cryptosystem in 2001. Similar
to the ElGamal cryptosystem, the main purpose of AES is to ensure the confiden-
tiality of messages. Given the fact that symmetric cryptosystems are generally
more efficient than their asymmetric counterparts, private channels between
communication partners are established by the use of the AES cryptosystem.
Diffie-Hellman key exchange Building upon an established PKI, the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange [29] protocol allows two communication partners to create
an AES key. In general boardroom voting protocols build upon a more efficient
version of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [30].
Commitment schemes Commitment schemes allow to commit on a message
and to ensure its confidentiality, while permitting to expose the message after-
wards. Commitment schemes find numerous applications in boardroom voting
protocols, e.g. to commit on a vote in the voting phase which is only revealed
in the tallying phase. The herein investigated protocols build upon a simple
commitment scheme in which a group generator is raised to the power of the
committing value, as used in [24].
Zero-knowledge proofs The main purpose of zero-knowledge proofs is to
prove the validity of statements without revealing anything beyond the validity
of the statement. Starting with the seminal work by Goldwasser et al. [31],
numerous zero-knowledge proofs have been constructed. Two well-established
zero-knowledge proofs are the proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm (also
called preimage proofs) [32] and the proof of equality of two discrete logarithms [33].
Another type of zero-knowledge proofs are well-formedness proofs which are used
to prove that a ciphertext/commitment contains a message from a given set
of messages. Depending on the structure of the given message set, proofs can
be optimized with regard to their efficiency, e.g. [25]. These zero-knowledge
proofs find their application in the boardroom voting protocols to prove various
statements, e.g. the well-formedness of cast votes.
Threshold ElGamal key generation and threshold ElGamal decryption
The ElGamal cryptosystem comes with the shortcoming that the private key
might be misused by one entity (keyholder). The herein investigated protocols
address this shortcoming by generating a public ElGamal key and a set of private
ElGamal key shares according to a combination of a distributed secret sharing
scheme [34,35] with the ElGamal cryptosystem, as suggested in [36]. Thereby, at
no point in time, the private key is in possession of a single entity, but rather
each entity holds only a share of the private key. Furthermore, the loss of private
key can be prevented by the fact that only a threshold amount of key shares is
required for decryption. Each decrypting entity provides a zero-knowledge proof
about the validity of the decryption. Other entities can check the validity of these
proofs and eventually, a threshold amount of valid partial decryption shares can
be used to reconstruct the plaintext.
Reencryption mix net The purpose of a reencryption mix net is to anonymize
a set of ciphertexts, such that links between the output ciphertexts and the input
ciphertexts cannot be established. The anonymization is realized by sequentially
and independently, i.e. by different mix nodes, shuﬄing the set of ciphertexts and
providing a correctness proof showing that the content of input ciphertexts and
output ciphertexts are equal. Shuﬄing is done by rerandomizing and permuting
the ciphertexts which becomes possible because of the homomorphic property of
the ElGamal cryptosystem. The boardroom voting protocols considered in this
work implement a correctness proof of shuﬄe according to [37,38].
7 Boardroom Voting Protocols
This section describes and evaluates the four boardroom voting protocols satisfy-
ing the proposed security model. Each protocol is described in terms of required
calculations per voter (relying on used cryptographic building blocks). Thereby,
we are able to provide the overview of protocols’ efficiency in form of parametrized
functions.
We further provide an overview of the communication complexity of the
protocols, by providing the total number of messages sent in the protocol run,
and the size of messages. Unless stated otherwise, all the messages given are sent
via broadcast channel. Given that the computations occur in cyclic group Gq
with a multiplicative order q, the size of messages is determined as a number of
elements in groups Gq or Zq. Note, that the size of a signatures is not included in
the analysis. We note, however, that a comparison of the protocols based upon
both the computational and communication complexity is out of scope for this
work, since it assumes taking into account many factors that depend on practical
implementation, such as the quality of the network, or the implementation of a
broadcast channel.
7.1 Homomorphic tallying, single encryption
The general idea of this protocol is that voters encrypt their ballots into one
ciphertext. The individual ciphertexts of voters are finally aggregated into one
ciphertext by using the homomorphic property of the ElGamal cryptosystem and
then tallied.
Initialization: Parts of the protocol rely on the use of private communication
channels. Therefore, in the initialization phase, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
is executed between each pair of voters (N exponentiations). Additional costs
of each voter are the signing of one message and verifying the signatures of
N − 1 messages. The total costs of the initilization phase are thus 3N − 1
exponentiations.
Setup: In the setup phase, the distributed key generation for the threshold of
t ≤ N is executed. This takes a total of 3N + t− 2 exponentiations (N + t− 2 for
generating private key shares, and 2N for generating the public key). Each voter
has to sign N + 1 and to verify the signatures of 3(N − 1) messages, resulting in
total computational cost for the setup phase of 10N + t− 7 exponentiations.
Vote Casting: In order to cast her vote, first the voter encrypts her vote into
a single ElGamal ciphertext (2 exponentiations)8. In addition to the encrypted
vote, voters provide a well-formedness proof stating that the ciphertext contains a
valid vote. The proof takes 11 exponentiations. Including the costs of signing one
message and verifying the signatures on N − 1 messages, the total computational
costs for the vote casting phase are 12 + 2N exponentiations. Tallying: To
compute the final tally, first each voter verifies the correctness of all N − 1 well-
formedness proofs obtained from the others, requiring 11(N − 1) exponentiations.
The decryption of the election result requires from each voter the computation
of a partial decryption share (1 exponentiation) and the generation of a validity
proof for the decryption (2 exponentiations), the verification of other voters’
proofs (4 exponentiations for each proof), and the reconstruction of the plaintext
from the threshold amount of partial decryption shares (t exponentiations). Note,
that since a total of t valid partial decryption shares is needed for the plaintext
reconstruction, the exact number of proofs one has to verify depends on whether
there are corrupted voters that send invalid proofs that still need to be processed.
However, the presence of invalid proofs seems not to be realistic because the
effort needed for such a corruption is too high compared to the pay-off for the
adversary - after all, the election can only be slowed down, but not hindered
completely. Therefore in our analysis we consider the case, where no voters send
faulty messages, and a total of t− 1 proofs need to be verified.
Given the use of the exponential ElGamal cryptosystem, the determination
of the final election result requires the computation of a discrete logarithm. The
computation of this logarithm is implemented by an exhaustive search over all(
N+L
L
)
possibilities, resulting in an average of
(
N+L
L
)
/2 exponentiations. Including
the costs of signing one and verifying the signatures on t − 1 messages leads
8 Note, we assume that the device used by the voter encrypts the voting option that
she intended to cast. This can be ensured with either relying on the trustworthiness
of the device, or by applying verification mechanism like the Benaloh challenge [39].
to the total computational costs for this phase of 11N + 7t − 13 + (N+LL )/2
exponentiations.
Table 2: Homomorphic tallying, single encryption: The amount of exponentiations needed within a
protocol runs.
Initialization 3N − 1
Setup 10N + t− 7
Vote casting 12 + 2N
Tallying 11N + 7t− 13 + (N+L
L
)
/2
Total −9 + 26N + 8t+ (N+L
L
)
/2
Table 3: Homomorphic tallying, single encryption: Sent messages within a protocol run.
Phase Number of messages Size per message
Initialization N(N − 1)/2 Gq
Setup 2N Gq
Setup (private channels) N(N − 1) Zq
Vote casting N 6Gq + 5Zq
Tallying N 3Gq + Zq
7.2 Homomorphic tallying, multiple encryptions
Similarly to the homomorphic tallying (single encryption), voters’ ciphertexts
are aggregated in the tallying phase. As opposed to the single encryption case,
in the multiple encryption case, voters encrypt their ballots individually for each
possible voting option. Hence, in the tallying phase, the election result is tallied
by computing the number of votes each voting option has obtained, individually.
The initialization and setup phase are identical to the single encryption case.
Thus, we continue with describing the vote casting phase.
Vote Casting: In this approach, the cast vote is multiple ciphertexts each
representing one option. The selected option is represented as an encryption of 1,
and all the other options as encryptions of 0, with all the encryptions requiring a
total of 2L exponentiations. One then has to compute the well-formedness proofs
for each voting option as well as for their sum. These proofs require 6(L + 1)
exponentiations. Including the costs for signing one message and verifying the
signatures of N − 1 messages, the resulting computational costs for the vote
casting phase are 8L+ 2N + 5.
Tallying: Before computing the final tally, all (L+ 1)(N − 1) well-formedness
proofs are checked by every voter. This requires 8(LN+N−L−1) exponentiations.
The threshold decryption is then executed L times, once for each voting option.
As in Section 7.1, we assume that all the validity proofs for the decryption sent
during this phase are valid, and therefore the threshold decryption requires a total
of 5Lt−L exponentiations. Calculating the final result from the decrypted values
requires the computation of the result for each voting option individually, which,
however, consists of exponentiations with small exponents only (with values up
to N), and therefore is not included into the analysis. Additional costs consist
of signing one message and verifying the signatures of t− 1 messages. The final
computational costs of the tallying phase are therefore 8LN+8N−9L−9+5Lt+2t
exponentiations.
Table 4: Homomorphic tallying, multiple encryptions: The amount of exponentiations needed within
a protocol run.
Initialization 3N − 1
Setup 10N + t− 7
Vote casting 8L+ 2N + 5
Tallying 8LN + 8N − 9L− 9 + 5Lt+ 2t
Total −12 + 23N + 8LN − L+ 3t+ 5Lt
Table 5: Homomorphic tallying, multiple encryption: Sent messages within a protocol run.
Phase Number of messages Size per message
Initialization N(N − 1)/2 Gq
Setup 2N Gq
Setup (private channels) N(N − 1) Zq
Vote casting N (8L+ 6)Gq + (4L+ 4)Zq
Tallying N L(3Gq + Zq)
7.3 Mix Net-Based Tallying
The third protocol satisfying the proposed security model builds upon a different
approach to anonymize cast votes. Rather than aggregating votes in the tallying
phase, in the mix net-based approach votes are anonymized through shuﬄing
and tallied individually. Initialization and setup are identical to the protocols in
Section 7.1 and Section 7.2. We therefore omit their description here.
Vote Casting: To cast a vote, the voter first computes an ElGamal encryption
of her ballot (2 exponentiations). In addition, the voter proves knowledge of
the plaintext to enforce ballot-independence [40], which is done by proving the
knowledge of discrete logarithm (1 exponentiation). Additional computational
costs occur for signing one message and verifying the signatures on N−1 messages,
with the total costs being 2N + 2 exponentiations.
Tallying: At the beginning of the tallying phase, each voter verifies the plain-
text knowledge proofs of all other voters, resulting in 2(N − 1) exponentiations.
The remainder of the tallying is executed in two sub-phases: the mixing phase
and the decryption phase.
In the mixing sub-phase, a set of voters is selected for acting as a reencryption
mix nodes—one after each other according to the order agreed on in the setup
phase. At least 2 honest voters must participate in the mixing process; thus, the
total amount of mix nodes is N − t+29. In each mixing round, the computational
costs are 10N + 5 exponentiations for the mix node (2N for reencryption, 8N + 5
for the proof of shuﬄe), followed by 9N + 11 exponentiations for the rest of
the voters verifying the shuﬄe. Additional costs for the round consist of signing
(by the mixing node) and verifying the signature (by the rest of the voters) of
one message, consisting of 3 exponentiations. For N − t+ 2 mixing rounds, the
total costs for the mixing sub-phase thus are 19N2 + 59N − 19Nt − 19t + 36
exponentiations.
In the decryption phase, each of the N anonymized ciphertexts is decrypted
using the threshold decryption, resulting in 5Nt−N exponentiations10. Adding
the costs of signing one message and verifying t− 1 messages, the total costs of
the decryption sub-phase consist of 5Nt−N + 2t− 1 exponentiations.
In order to obtain the result, the votes for each option are being added up
over all decrypted votes. The total computational costs of the tallying phase are
therefore 19N2 + 58N − 14Nt− 17t+ 35 exponentiations.
Table 6: Mix net-based tallying: the amount of exponentiations needed within a protocol run.
Initialization 3N − 1
Setup 10N + t− 7
Vote casting 2N + 2
Tallying 19N2 + 58N − 14Nt− 17t+ 35
Total 19N2 + 73N − 14Nt− 16t+ 29
Table 7: Mix net-based tallying: Sent messages within a protocol run.
Phase Number of messages Size per message
Initialization N(N − 1)/2 Gq
Setup 2N Gq
Setup (private channels) N(N − 1) Zq
Vote casting N 3Gq + Zq
Tallying (mix) N (5N + 6)Gq + (3N + 5)Zq
Tallying (decrypt) N N(3Gq + Zq)
9 Note, that the verification of shuﬄe correctness is still being performed by all the
voters, so that each voter can verify the integrity of the election without trusting
anyone else.
10 Similar to Sections 7.1 and 7.2, we assume that no voters send faulty validity proofs
for the decryption.
7.4 Protocol Based on Self-Dissolving Commitments
Similar to the protocol in Section 7.1, the fourth protocol is based on the concept
of homomorphic tallying, with the vote encoded as a single value. The difference
to the previous protocols is that there is no common public encryption key and
hence votes are not truly encrypted.
Setup: Every voter picks a random value and communicates its commitment
together with the preimage proof to all other voters, which requires 2 exponenti-
ations for commitment and proof, and 1 exponentiation for signing the message.
When all N−1 such pairs of commitments and proofs have been received from the
other voters and successfully verified (2N − 2 exponentiations for the verification
of the proof, and 2N−2 for the verification of signatures on N−1 messages), each
voter uses them to calculate the value needed for casting the vote (note, that this
calculation requires only multiplications and calculation of inverse, therefore not
included in our efficiency analysis). The total costs of setup phase are therefore
4N − 1 exponentiations.
Vote Casting: To cast a vote for an option, each voter computes one commit-
ment to their vote (1 exponentiation). Before communicating the commitment
to everyone, the voter computes the corresponding well-formedness proof (11
exponentiations)11. Casting the vote to the others is done in two rounds, first
by communicating the proof (which serves the purpose of a commitment) and
second by communicating the vote (2 exponentiations for signing 2 messages,
4N − 4 for verifying the signatures on 2(N − 1) messages). Sending the proof and
the vote separately is necessary for the fairness property of the protocol. Overall,
the computational costs for the vote casting phase are 4N + 10 exponentiations.
Recovery: If in any previous step a voter stops following the protocol, a special
recovery phase exists for the set of remaining voters to guarantee the robustness
of the protocol. Given the fact that the adversary might block the access to
the communication channel for several voters 4, we consider the conduct of a
recovery phase. The phase requires 1 exponentiation in addition to one proof
of discrete logarithm equality (2 exponentiation) and verification of N − 1 such
proofs (4N − 4 exponentiations). Furthermore, additional costs are for signing of
one message and verifying the signatures of N − 1 messages, resulting in total of
6N − 2 exponentiations.
Tallying: After positive verification of the well-formedness proofs exchanged
during vote casting (11(N − 1) exponentiations), the encoded final result is
obtained, which requires an an exhaustive search over
(
N+L
L
)
possibilities, and
correspondingly performing an average of
(
N+L
L
)
/2 exponentiations.The total
costs for tallying phase are therefore 11N − 11 + (N+LL )/2.
11 This is possible considering the commitment in setup round and the commitment in
this round as an ElGamal-like ciphertext.
Table 8: Protocol based on self-dissolving commitments: the amount of exponentiations needed within
a protocol run.
Setup 4N − 1
Vote casting 4N + 10
Recovery 6N − 2
Tallying 11N − 11 + (N+L
L
)
/2
Total (with recovery round) 25N − 4 + (N+L
L
)
/2
Total (without recovery round) 19N − 2 + (N+L
L
)
/2
Table 9: Protocol based on self-dissolving commitments: Sent messages within a protocol run.
Phase Number of messages Size per message
Setup N 2Gq + Zq
Vote casting (commit) N 4Gq + 5Zq
Vote casting (vote) N Gq
Recovery N 2Zq + Zq
8 Efficiency Comparison in Different Election Settings
In this section we illustrate and compare the performance of the protocols in
different election settings. We variate the electorate size between 2 and 30 voters
and the number of voting options as follows: 2, 5, 10 and 30. For our evaluation,
we consider the established PKI based on DSA keys. In addition, according to the
security model proposed in Section 4, we set the threshold value t = bN/2c+ 1.
Finally, we set key lengths to 224 bits and use elliptic curves. For our time
estimantions we use the benchmark for exponentiation on Google Nexus 4, which
we then multiply with the number of total required modular exponentiations for
the protocols.
The charts show12 that the protocols based on self-dissolving commitments
and single encryption homomorphic tallying perform particularly well for simple
ballot types, for instance with 2 voting options. The exponential computations
with such ballots require less than 0.52 second for an electorate size of 30 voters.
In contrast, conducting the election on the basis of the multiple encryption
homomorphic tallying protocol requires 0.6 seconds. Even worse, running the
election based on mix net requires around 6 seconds.
The multiple encryption homomorphic tallying protocol outperforms the
self-dissolving commitments and the single encryption homomorphic protocol
when the election setting gets more complex. More precisely, having 7 or more
voters with 5 voting options, see Figure 2; having 4 or more voters with 10 voting
options, see Figure 3; and having 2 or more voters with 30 voting options, see
Figure 4. For instance, in the case of 10 voting options and an electorate size of
30 voters, the exponential computations require around 2 seconds for the multiple
12 Note, that in Figures 3 and 4 the lines for single encryption homomorphic tallying
and self-dissolving commitments coincide.
Fig. 1: Relation between the number of voters and the number of seconds required for the computa-
tions for a total of 2 voting options.
Fig. 2: Relation between the number of voters and the number of seconds required for the computa-
tions for a total of 5 voting options.
Fig. 3: Relation between the number of voters and the number of seconds required for the computa-
tions of 10 voting options.
Fig. 4: Relation between the number of voters and the number of seconds required for the computa-
tions of 30 voting options.
encryption homomorphic tallying protocol, while 55 hours are required for the
single encryption homomorphic tallying protocol.
In case of 30 voting options, for less than 25 voters, the mix net-based protocol
outperforms all other protocols. For instance, given an electorate size of 15 voters
and 30 voting options, the mix net-based protocol requires 1.7 seconds. For the
same setting the multiple encryption homomorphic tallying protocol takes 2.4
seconds and the single encryption homomorphic tallying protocol even more than
a year.
9 Conclusion
In this work, we conducted an efficiency evaluation of cryptographic protocols
proposed in the literature for boardroom voting setting. For this, we first derived
a security model adequate to the boardroom voting setting. Then, we conducted
a literature review on boardroom voting protocols, and extracted those that
satisfy our security model. Further, we analyzed the efficiency of each protocol
by calculating the number of exponentiations of the used cryptographic building
blocks and provide an overview of the protocols’ efficiency in form of parametrized
functions. Finally, we provided a performance comparison of the considered proto-
cols within different election settings. The results of the performance comparison
indicate that there is no protocol that is the most efficient in all election settings.
Rather, choosing the most adequate protocol depends on the concrete election
setting.
For the future, we guide research into two directions. First, we plan to conduct
a more fine-grained security analysis of the protocols considered in this work, in
order to investigate the trade-off between efficiency and security in the context
of different boardroom voting settings. Second, the literature provides a variety
of cryptographic protocols for electronic voting. These protocols might be more
efficient than the protocols we considered, however, these protocols have not
been adapted for the boardroom voting context, which is often a non-trivial task.
Therefore, we intend to identify the most efficient protocols and tailor them to
the boardroom voting context such that they satisfy our security model. Finally,
we plan to extend the present work with those tailored protocols.
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